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1. Introduction 
iterature on unemployment insurance in a search and matching framework has 
ainly concentrated on the direct effects on agents’ adjustment and on unemployment. How 
his effect differs across bargaining institution, and potentially changes the bargaining 
nstitutions themselves has attracted less attention.  In this paper, I examine these questions 
y analyzing the theoretical linkage between unemployment benefits and the setting of the 
argaining process between firm and workers. Concentrating on the choice of two 
lternative bargaining institutions, individual and collective bargaining, I take advantage of a 
earch and matching framework with endogenous union formation presented in the paper: 
Product Market Regulation and Endogenous Union Formation” by Ebell and Haefke 
2006). In this paper, Ebell and Haefke examine the link between product market regulation 
nd union formation. They show that the effect of product market competition on 
nemployment depends crucially on the choice of bargaining regime. Here, I contribute to 
he theory of union formation by considering the importance of the benefit entitlements to 
he worker in the bargaining process. Building on the result of Ebell and Haefke (2006), I 
urther explore the importance of the degree of product market competition when 
onsidering the effect of unemployment benefits on labour market outcomes.  
s Germany is a country characterized by a high coverage of collective agreements 
Calmfors, 2004), I calibrate the collective bargaining version of the model to match German 
ong-run labour market data. Using the same baseline values obtained from the calibration, I 
ompare the labour market equilibrium response of each bargaining regime by simulating 
oth bargaining versions of the model. Taking amongst many factors also account of the 
ong-run adjustment in competition and the government’s budget constraint, the model 
imulation provides more than a partial analysis of the labor market, illustrating the steady 
tate equilibrium response in all key variables of the model. Further, focusing on the 
mplication of a cut in benefit entitlements, I relate the results of the model to the recent 
abour market reforms in Germany that was taken as a measure to activate the unemployed 
Wurzel, 2006).  
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1.1 Literature Review 
  The debate on unemployment insurance and labor market efficiency is mainly 
concentrated about the disincentive effect versus the quality of a job match.  
The inefficiency occurs as high unemployment insurance changes the unemployed 
worker’s incentive by making them more selective to job offerings. Sargent and Ljungqvist 
(1998) blame the welfare state’s ability to cope with turbulent times as the cause of high and 
persistent unemployment rates: Highly skilled workers reject job transitions which involve 
accumulation of new skill due to too generous unemployment compensation. Especially after 
large negative shocks to the economy, the welfare state lacks the flexibility in the labor 
market to reconstruct the economy.  Likewise, Pissarides (2000) discuss the implication of a 
higher non-market return to the individual in a standard search and matching framework: 
The workers claim a higher wage level as the cost of being unemployed decreases. Hence 
unemployment benefits prevent wages from fully absorbing productivity changes. 
Contrary, Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) claim that the unemployment benefits works 
as a “search subsidy” (Burdett, 1979) improving the quality of a potential job match. It 
follows that the growth of productivity per worker is higher in an economy with 
unemployment insurance than without; as workers then get jobs that are more compatible 
with their skill-level. In accordance, Tatsiramos (2006) finds by examining data from eight 
European countries empirical evidence that suggests the matching effect of unemployment 
insurance: Countries with relative generous unemployment insurance shows higher 
employment stability due to the rise in average employment duration.       
Taken together, the literature on unemployment insurance characterizes a trade-off 
between unemployment and the miss-match of workers’ skill and job. Both occur as a result 
of labor market frictions and uncertainty. Further in the analysis I will concentrate on the 
disincentive effect of unemployment benefits in a search and matching framework, and 
examine how labor market outcomes depend on the bargaining process between firm and 
workers.    
In the matching-bargaining models of Pissarides and Mortensen firms’ vacancies and 
unemployed workers match according to a specified matching-function, reflecting the 
frictions in the labor market. After the job match is made, terms of trade are determined by a 
bargaining process that leads to a given sharing rule of the surplus (Hosios, 1990).  The 
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xistence of the bargaining process depends crucially on two main assumptions: First, there 
as to occur a surplus from the job match. And second, ex-ante wage commitment need to be 
uled out, such that firm and workers can only agree on a surplus-sharing rule after the job 
atch is made. 
oen (1997) presents a competitive equilibrium model with frictions in the labor 
arket.1 By first stating that a job match is associated with a surplus due to the cost of 
earch for both firms and workers, he introduces a setting for ex-ante wage determination:  
n contrast to the wage bargaining setting between firm and agents, firms announce a wage 
ffer when stating the vacancy. And by offering higher wages, firms can potentially attract 
ore applications.  In this scenario firms are not likely to re-bargain their offer after the job 
atch is made, as they are bounded by the given wage offer due to reputation effects and 
abor unions. But workers, given a high enough relative bargaining power, can gain from re-
argaining. Thus Moen (1997) suggests that wage determination depends on the relative 
argaining power of the worker, where ex-post bargaining is likely to occur in labor markets 
here the workers’ relative bargaining power is relatively high.2 I assume further and in the 
alibration of the model that the relative bargaining power of workers in Germany is 
elatively high, thus making ex-post wage bargaining a realistic feature of the model.  
bell and Haefke (2006) show that bargaining regime is crucial for the effect of 
roduct market competition on unemployment rates. By endogenizing the choice of 
argaining institution in a standard search and matching framework they examine the 
tability of two alternative wage bargaining settings: Collective and individual bargaining. 
hey illustrate that under collective bargaining the worker’s surplus is given by a profit 
hare, in contrast to individual bargaining where the worker’s surplus reflects the marginal 
alue of the worker to the firm, which is equalized to the marginal worker’s hiring costs in 
quilibrium. This has two main implications for the labor market: First, the employment 
evel is relatively higher under individual bargaining, as firms can depress the wage level by 
verhiring due to the decreasing value of the worker to the firm in employment level. And 
econd, the collective bargaining surplus to the worker is decreasing with product market 
 
1
2
t
 Competitive equilibrium implies that all agents are characterized by price-taking behavior. 
 Moen (1997) claims that the worker can only improve his wage through re-bargaining given a relative bargaining power 
hat exceeds the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment.  
 4 
                                             
competition, whereas the worker’s surplus under individual bargaining increases. In 
conclusion Ebell and Haefke (2006) determine a negative relation between the collective 
bargaining coverage rate and product market competition from the model. By calibrating the 
individual bargaining version of the model to US data, they simulate the model to both US- 
and EU- entry costs. Under EU-entry costs the collective bargaining institution is supported 
as a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the model. Thus Ebell and Haefke (2006) conclude that 
the relatively high degree of product market regulation may explain the relatively high 
unemployment rates in European labor markets.  
  To illustrate the importance of wage bargaining settings when considering the labor 
market response of a change in unemployment benefits, I will take advantage of the ex-post 
wage bargaining model used by Ebell and Haefke (2006). They specify a dynamic general 
equilibrium model which combines monopolistic competition in the goods market with 
unemployment arising from Mortensen-Pissarides-style matching frictions. What separates 
this model from the standard Mortensen-Pissarides search friction model is that the workers 
have the opportunity to collectively decide on the type of bargaining process in each firm, 
making union formation an endogenous factor of the model.3 To simplify, I separate as Ebell 
and Haefke (2006) between two alternative wage bargaining settings: Collective and 
individual bargaining. Under collective bargaining the coalition of workers negotiate with 
the firm together, in a process where they negotiate both over the wage and the number of 
workers. Whereas, under individual bargaining each worker is treated as a marginal worker 
and wages are negotiated between each worker and the firm individually.  
1.2 Reforming the German Labor Market  
The German government introduced in 2003 and 2005 several labor market reforms 
through the bill called Gesetz zu Reformen am Arbeitsmarkt (Bill for reforming the labor 
market) (Neugart, 2005). In previous years the labor market had performed poorly and 
inflexible: Data reveals a rising level of unemployment rates through the 1990’s, with 
unemployment rising when negative shocks hit the economy but falling only partially when 
 
3 I assume further and in the model description that all workers are characterized by the same identical preferences. Thus 
the choice of bargaining regime can be represented by the preference of one individual agent as the preferences of the 
remaining workers in the firm coincide. 
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he shocks subsided. Accompanying the rising trend in unemployment rates was an 
ncreasing share of long-run unemployment (Wurzel, 2006). 
ith the German economy showing symptoms of a too generous unemployment 
ompensation, the government introduced in 2005 a replacement scheme with a considerable 
eduction in benefit’s entitlements to the unemployed.4 Taking advantage of the OECD 
nternational measurement on replacement rate (Martin, 1996), Figure 1 illustrates the 
egative shift in benefits entitlements.  Showing both the gross- and net replacement rate of 
ermany, the year 2005 illustrates the considerable shift in benefit entitlements for 
nemployed workers compared to the income level of the working part of the economy.5 
s discussed in the literature a cut in unemployment insurance increases the cost of 
eing unemployed, thus reducing the worker’s wage demand in the wage bargaining process. 
ccording to theory, the policy measure would result in less selective workers making the 
erman labor market more flexible. Yet due to the different structure of the wage 
egotiation process, a reduction in wage demand does not imply the same labor market 
utcome for an individual and collective bargaining economy.  
n chapter 2 I present the model of Ebell and Haefke (2006). The choice of 
argaining institution appears as a crucial factor when considering the properties of the 
orkers’ surplus: As the individually bargaining firm considers each worker on the margin, 
he worker surplus reflects the marginal value of the worker to the firm. In contrast, under 
ollective bargaining firm and workers are assumed to negotiate both over wages and 
mployment level. Due to the workers’ joint power in the negotiation process, the workers’ 
urplus reflects a share from total profits from production.  
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 The welfare reform was bundled into four packages: The Hartz I to Hartz IV. They consisted of several adjustments in the 
abor market as the establishment of job centers and increased access to training centers for unemployed (Calmfors, 2004).   
ne of the main contributions and most discussed aspect is the Hartz IV which merged the benefits for long-term 
nemployed and social assistance into Unemployment Benefit II, leaving both at a relative lower level than before 
Neugart, 2005). The Hartz IV reform also reduced the duration before an unemployed worker exhaust the relatively higher 
nemployment insurance: Prior to the Hartz IV an unemployed worker would receive unemployment insurance from 12-32 
onths depending on private work history and age. After 2005, the worker's period for receiving unemployment insurance 
as restricted to a maximum of 12 month or 18 month if the worker had passed the age of 55 (OECD, 2007).  
 The replacement rate is defined as the proportion of expected income from work which is replaced by unemployment and 
elated welfare benefits, gross- and net replacement rate refer respectively to the compared income level before and after 
ax reduction (Martin, 1996). 
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Further, the worker surplus proves to be a decisive factor in the model when 
considering the optimal adjustment of the firm and the distribution of increased labor costs: 
First, as discussed by Ebell and Haefke (2006), the individual bargaining firm settles for a 
higher allocation of labor than the efficient outcome. The intuition follows from the worker 
surplus: As the workers’ value decrease in employment, individual bargaining firms choose 
to overhire to depress wages and thereby secure a larger share of the total surplus from 
production. In contrast, under collective bargaining both firm and workers have the same 
coinciding incentive to maximize profits. Thus the collective bargaining process results in an 
efficient adjustment of employment in firm-level equilibrium. 
Second, the setting of the wage bargaining process is essential when considering how 
firms and workers share the cost of increased unemployment benefits. Under both bargaining 
regimes workers are at least guaranteed the income they enjoy as unemployed to secure a 
non-negative surplus from employment. Collective bargaining divides profits between 
workers and the firm according to relative bargaining powers. Thus the firm and the 
coalition of workers share the cost of increased wage demand as unemployment benefits 
increase. Under individual bargaining the worker’s surplus reflects the marginal value of the 
worker to the firm. Hence, the worker surplus is not directly affected by the increase in 
unemployment compensation.  
1.3  The Policy Experiment 
The main contribution of the analysis is a simulation of the ex-post wage bargaining 
model of Ebell and Haefke (2006). In Chapter 5 I carry out a policy experiment by 
simulating the steady state general equilibrium of the model for several degrees of 
unemployment compensation. The possible values of unemployment benefits are chosen 
exogenously, reflecting the government’s policy instrument in the model.  
As Germany is a country where the majority of workers are covered by union wage 
contracts (Burda, et. al., 2008), I calibrate the collective bargaining version of the model to 
German long run data.6  I use the obtained parameter values from the calibration and solve 
 
a 6 Burda, et. al (2008) reports from the German Structure of Earnings Survey 2001, a large linked employer-employee dat
file with detailed information on whether or not a worker is covered by a collective agreement, that in a sample of male 
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or both the collective and individual bargaining economy for all possible degrees of 
nemployment compensation. Further, I use the quantitative results from the model 
imulation to analyze and compare the equilibrium response of each bargaining regime from 
 lasting change in the level of unemployment benefits.7    
he simulation provides important insight into the dominating factors in each 
argaining version of the model. In both bargaining economies a rise in unemployment 
ompensation is met by higher labor costs and unemployment accompanied by a decrease in 
oth after tax wage level and worker surplus. Even though both bargaining economies show 
he same qualitative adjustment from the policy experiment, the simulation suggests that the 
ize of the response depends crucially on bargaining regime: The model illustrates a much 
tronger response in collective bargaining unemployment and after tax wages compared to 
he individual bargaining economy. The response of the worker surplus is, however, stronger 
nder individual bargaining. This follows from the dominating adjustment of individual 
argaining firms. As the individual bargaining firm can raise its own profit by depressing the 
age level, the cost of increased wage demand is distributed through the overhiring effect 
rom the firm to the workers in the model. This is the same factor that leads to the weaker 
ncrease in steady state unemployment as labor costs increase. On the other side the efficient 
djustment of the collective bargaining firm and the even distribution of increased labor 
osts lead to the strong response in collective bargaining unemployment as wage demand 
ncrease. 
s Ebell and Haefke (2006) pointed out that the degree of product market competition 
s a crucial factor when considering the worker’s surplus in the model, I simulate the 
quilibrium response from the policy experiment for several degrees of competition. When 
ompetition decreases firms leave the market and the remaining firms are left with more 
onopoly power in the product market and thus higher profit from production. Under 
                                                                                                   
full-time employees in West-Germany aged 25-55 years 61% was covered by a industry level bargaining, 28 % by firm-
level bargaining and 11 % by individual negotiation. 
7
e
i
 
 As the level of benefit entitlements is one of the government’s policy instruments, it is not given that the cut in benefit 
ntitlements is a lasting one. But as this analysis restricted to steady state, only a lasting change in unemployment benefits 
s relevant.  
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ment benefits. And 
second, the model illustrates stronger sensitivity in collective bargaining wages from a 
change in unem
2006), 
he 
ult from the model is clear: 
Workers choose to form collective bargaining coalitions for all levels of unemployment 
benefits as they prefer the higher collective bargaining surplus. 
the level 
uss 
 summarizes the main results of the 
policy experiment. Finally, section 6 concludes and summarizes important findings from the 
an labor market. 
aefke 
teady sta firm-level equilibrium of the two bargaining regimes, 
collective bargaining the worker surplus reflects the potential profits from production. Thu
workers demand a surplus reflecting the monopoly power of the individual firm. That
demand increases both when unemployment benefits rise and when the firms’ monopoly 
power increase has two main implications for the model: First, the model simulation 
suggests that the high level of unemployment in collective bargaining economies results
from a combination of high monopoly power to the firm and unemploy
ployment compensation for low levels of competition. 
The final contribution of the thesis follows the procedure of Ebell and Haefke (
and examine if a lasting change in unemployment benefits actually affects the setting of t
bargaining process itself. Letting the choice of bargaining process for each firm be an 
endogenous factor of the model, I check numerically for both bargaining economies the 
necessary conditions for a symmetric Nash equilibrium. The res
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model and outlines 
the implications on key factors in the economy with respect to a lasting change in 
of unemployment benefits. Section 3 follows with the determination of general equilibrium 
and introduce the free entry condition, thus making the degree of product market 
competition an endogenous variable in the long run version of the model. Further I disc
why the model of Ebell and Haefke (2006) does not necessarily lead to an efficient 
allocation of search intensity. Section 4 gives a short analysis of bargaining institution 
stability and how it relates to employment, worker’s surplus and wages. Section 5 explains 
the calibration of the model to German long run data and
model and how they relate to the Germ
2. The Basic Model 
In this chapter I present the basic framework of the model used by Ebell and H
(2006). I separate between s te 
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where th
b
e alternative wage bargaining settings, collective bargaining and individual 
argaining, are indexed by .  
In the next chapter follows the description of general equilibrium where I impose 
teady state and introduce the long run free-entry condition: In the long-run the degree of 
roduct market competition is no longer given, but endogenously determined such that 
s
p profit 
net of entry costs is driven down to zero. In chapter 4, I evaluate the necessary conditions for 
g regime. Thus connecting the Nash equilibriums with respect to the choice of bargainin
outcome of bargaining institution     in the single firm with the rest of the economy.  
2.1 Friction in the Labor Market 
The labor market is assumed to be uncoordinated, time consuming and costly for 
oth firms and workers, yet it is characterized by a well-behaved search and matching
ework where the number of jobs formed depends on ratio of vacancies to 
ployment (Pissarides, 2000).  Each agent 
b  
fram
unem  in the model can either be employed or 
ployed. The aggregate unemunem ployed individuals  and the aggregate vacancies  are 
matched according to a constant return to scale matching function: , 
where  is the elasticity of the matching function and  is a scaling parameter. Hence, vacant 
obs become filled at the rate  j   and unemployed workers find work at 
the rate   , where  the ratio of vacancies to searching workers, is 
efined as the labour market tightness. As the labour market tightness will vary with respd ect 
to bargaining regimes, I separate the possible outcomes of  with the subscript  as a 
measure of the collective coverage rate in the economy. If all firms in the economy engage 
in collective bargaining, then , and if all firms engage individual bargaining, then 
. 
A match can be separated for two possible reasons: Either the firm exits the market 
with probability  or the match is destroyed with probability . This leads to the expression 
r total separation rate as fo . As firms will continue to enter the economy until 
rofit net of entry costs equals zero, the property that the firms can not expectp  to live forever 
is crucial when considering the costs of entry to the firm. In the case that the firm never 
ceased to exist, the importance of the cost of entry would be greatly understated as it could 
be distributed over the total life span of the firm. (Ebell and Haefke, 2006)  
 10 
2.2 The Government’s Budget Constraint and Policy 
Instruments 
 The employed worker receives an income each period given by the wage  , while 
the unemployed worker receives some compensation , which is the policy determined 
variable in the model. Following Ebell and Haefke’s model I introduce two types of income 
taxes to finance the unemployment benefit: The single worker has to pay an income tax  
each period and all firms have to pay a payroll tax for each hired worker given by . As the 
government has no access to capital markets, the government’s tax income has to finance the 
equilibrium expenditure of unemployment benefit each single period. Thus the government’s 
budget constraint is given by: 
  (1)  
To simplify, the unemployment benefits are financed by equal magnitude of the two taxes 
rates, thus it follows that  throughout the model. This leaves two potential policy 
instruments for the government given by the tax rates and unemployment benefits. But given 
the finance constraint, the instruments are not independent and the government can only 
decide on one of the policy instruments (Pissarides, 2000). As the target of the analysis is the 
implication of changes in unemployment benefits,  will be the exogenously determined 
policy variable, and the necessary changes in tax rates are taken into account by equation (1) 
throughout the model.  
2.3 The Value of Employment and Unemployment 
All individuals are assumed to be identical, risk neutral and there exists no disutility 
from the effort they invest in job search and work (Williamson, 1999).8  Hence, if  and 
 are the values of  employment and unemployment to the agent respectively, then the 
agent’s maximization problem in steady state can be summarized by the Bellman equations: 
Value of employment: 
                                              
8 By assuming identical individuals in the model, I abstract from the quality of a job match.  
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(2) 
alue of unemployment: 
 (
T
3)     
he wage  is determined endogenously from the bargaining process . Thus the 
ncome from working one period is given by the net wage i .  The value of 
mployment, given by equation (3), is determined by the net wage and the discounted 
xpected value of the following period. It differs from the income as workers suffer the risk 
f unemployment in the future.  As workers can either continue to work or suffer a 
eparation with probability 
e
e
o
s , the expected value of  the next period is given by the value of 
ach possible outcome weighted by their probabilities (Williamson, 1999).   e
  The value of unemployment   is the same for all unemployed workers as it 
nly depends on the total mix of bargaining institution in the economy and not on the 
argaining institutions the individual worker engaged in during previous employment. Each 
nemployed agent enjoy unemployment benefits 
o
b
u  and the next periods expected value is 
haracterized by the probability of moving into employment c , either in a firm with 
ollective bargaining or in a firm with individual bargaining where the probability for each 
utcome is determined by the total mix of bargaining institutions given respectively by 
c
o  
and .  
 The worker surplus  is defined as the difference in the value of employment and 
nemployment and can be derived from equation (2) and (3): u
 
 
   
T
n
(4)
 
 
hus the surplus from employment depends positively on the bargaining wage and 
egatively on the worker’s outside option and the income tax. 
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2.4 The Goods Market and Monopolistic Competition 
  All individuals  in the economy are assumed to have identical Dixit-Stiglitz 
preferences over a continuum of differential goods .  Each agent maximizes their own utility 
given their budget constraint, leading to the maximization problem: 
  (5) 
given the budget constraint:   (6) 
Where  denotes the consumption of good  by individual ,   is the real income of 
household  ,  is the price of good ,   is the aggregate price level and  
is the elasticity of substitution across goods. Solving the individual’s maximization problem 
leads to the monopolistic demand function for good  (Ebell and Haefke, 2006): 
  (7) 
where  is the total real income from all agents. From equation (7) it follows that 
the demand for good  is increasing in the income level and falling in the relative price.  is 
the price elasticity of the demand function. Thus it reflects the degree of product market 
competition in the economy. The higher the value of  , the more competition and the lower 
is the market power of the single firm. Thus when ,  the goods market approaches 
perfect competition, and the demand for good  is approximately unaffected by a relative 
change in  price.    
2.5 The Firm’s Problem 
All firms maximize profit each period taking account of the monopolistic demand 
function with price elasticity  . To simplify I assume that labor is the only input in the 
production process, where there occurs no disruption from the natural exchange of workers 
when a match is separated and the worker is replaced by a new agent (Stole and Zwiebel, 
1996). The same property follows for exchanged firms: The new firms that enter the 
economy each period and replace the firms that left continue production without disruption 
at the same steady state level.  
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Hours per worker is fixed, and consistent with stylized facts, I assume that firms 
djust employment only by the number of workers hired, i.e. on the extensive margin (Ebell, 
006). Thus it’s crucial to assume multi-worker firms: As production depends on the price 
lasticity under monopolistic competition, which is an endogenous variable of the model, so 
oes the size of the firm. It follows that with the number of hours being fixed, the firm needs 
o adjust the number of workers to produce optimal (Ebell and Haefke, 2006).          
nder both bargaining regimes the real wage and hired workers are the control 
ariables to be determined in firm-level equilibrium. Even though firms’ decision and 
utcome differ with the bargaining process, the basic optimization problem is the same: In 
oth scenarios firms want to maximize profits, it is the degree of decision variables left alone 
o the firm that separates the adjustment under the two bargaining regimes. Under individual 
argaining the firm can choose the firm’s employment level freely, whereas under collective 
argaining both real wage and firm-level employment are outcomes of the bargaining 
rocess. It follows that the firm’s outside option when the bargaining process shuts down is 
ne of the key factors that separates the two bargaining regimes: Under individual 
argaining the firm produces with one less worker, whereas under collective bargaining the 
irm is dissolved. 
he value of firm , , equals the discounted stream of present and future 
aximized profits, fulfilling the Bellman Equation: m
  
S
T
(8) 
ubject to: 
he demand function for good  derived from equation (7): 
  (9) 
The production function:  (10) 
The transition function:  (11) 
The wage curve:  (12) 
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Where  denotes the cost of stating one vacancy ,  is the number of workers hired 
by firm  where the subscript  refers to the number of workers hired in the following period, 
 is a technology measure in the production process and  is the total production by firm  
which equals the total demand in equilibrium. Each period the firm has to pay the payroll tax 
for all hired workers to the government of the amount  giving the total wage cost 
of .  The value of the firm the following period is discounted at the rate , 
where the firm takes account of the probability that it may exit the market, and the return 
from an alternative use of recourses .  The wage curve  depicts the outcome of 
the bargaining process between workers and firm , and thus how the wage depends on the 
number of workers hired. 
It is notable that firms lack the opportunity to decide directly on the optimal number 
of workers   to hire each period.  Instead taking the transition equation into account firms 
decide indirect on the optimal number of workers to hire the following period  by choosing 
the number of vacancies to open in the present period given by   in steady state, 
from equation (11). As  is the mean duration of a vacant job, the total cost of hiring one 
more worker equals . 
As both types of firm face the same basic maximization problem, the first order 
condition giving the optimal adjustment for firm  takes the same form for both bargaining 
regimes: 
  (13) 
Thus the optimal adjustment for firm  is obtained when the cost of hiring one more 
worker (given by the cost of opening enough vacancies the previous period) equals the 
discounted marginal surplus of the employment. The marginal surplus for firm   can be 
derived using the envelope condition on equation (8) with respect to the state variable , 
given equation (9)-(12): 
  (14) 
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rom equation (14) the marginal surplus equals the marginal product, potential 
hange in total wage cost and the marginal expected surplus to the firm from the possibility 
hat the worker continues into the next period leading to saved search costs. Inserting the 
irst order condition from equation (13) leads to the following Euler condition: 
 
H
(15) 
ence, under both bargaining regimes the optimal adjustment for firm  is obtained when the 
ost of hiring one more worker equals the discounted marginal surplus of the employment 
he following period, given by the right hand side of equation (15). 
c
t
N
d
b
2.6 The Bargaining Process and Firm-Level Equilibrium 
ext, I determine firm-level equilibrium for both types of bargaining firms. I 
escribe separately the individual and collective bargaining process for a given mix of 
argaining institution . Further, I focus on how bargaining wages and worker surplus 
epend on the value of unemployment. d
U
2.6.1 Individual Bargaining  
nder individual bargaining firm  treats each worker as a marginal worker and 
egotiate the wage with each worker pair wise (Stole and Zwiebel, 1996), thus the only 
utcome and decision variable of the bargaining process is the  individual bargaining wage 
n
o
.  The number of workers hired in firm  follows from the number of vacancies the 
irm chose to open in the previous period, which the individual bargaining firm chooses 
reely. Upon making this decision the firm takes account of the wage curve 
f
f  that 
ollows endogenously from the individuals bargaining process: f
  
T
(16) 
he relative bargaining powers are reflected in the given parameter , where  is the 
argaining power of the individual worker and b  is the bargaining power of firm . The 
argaining process takes form as a standard generalized Nash bargaining problem, where 
ach worker wants to achieve the highest possible surplus from employment 
b
e , while 
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the firm wants to maximize the marginal surplus from hiring the additional worker.9 The 
steady state surplus to firm  follows from the long-run solution of equation (14):   
  (17) 
Inserting the surplus for the individual worker and for firm  from equation (4) and (17) into 
the Nash product (16) and maximizing, leads to the first-order differential equation of the 
wage curve:   
  (18) 
Where the solution is easily confirmed to be:10 
  (19) 
Equation (19) depicts how the individual bargaining wage depends on the number of 
workers hired in firm .  The change in the wage level from a marginal increase in 
employment is given by the negative expression: 
  (20) 
Hence, the more workers hired in firm  the lower is the agreed upon wage level from the 
individual bargaining process. This follows from the worker’s value to the firm: Under 
individual bargaining the worker’s value to the firm is the marginal product, which decreases 
with the number of employed workers (Ebell and Ritschl, 2007).  When the worker’s value 
to the firm decreases the firm is less willing to settle for higher wages in the bargaining 
process, as the potential gain of hiring the individual worker is reduced. By inserting the 
                                              
9 By setting  or , I refer respectively to the economy where all firms either engage in collective bargaining 
( ) or the economy where all firms engage in individual bargaining ( . 
10 I follow the same procedure used by Ebell and Ritschl (2007) to solve the first-order differential equation given by 
equation (18). The solution depends crucially on the assumption that . Thus I assume that firm-level 
bargaining wages do not explode as employment  approaches zero (Ebell and Ritschl, 2007). 
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age curve from equation (20) into the Euler condition of the firm, we obtain the optimal 
djustment of firm   in steady state, given the individual bargaining wage: 
  
I
i
w
t
o
m
(21) 
t follows from equation (21), that the firm’s optimal adjustment under individual bargaining 
s inefficient. With an efficient adjustment of the firm with respect to labor; I mean one 
here the private surplus and social surplus from increased employment coincide given that 
here exists no other labor market imperfections.11 The left hand side gives the marginal cost 
f hiring one more worker, which would under an efficient allocation of labor equal the 
arginal product of employment given here by . But as the firm takes account of 
he wage curve and the externality that an increase in the number of workers depresses the 
age level through the individual bargaining process, the firm chooses to hire more workers 
han the efficient outcome to save on the total cost of employment. Even though the firm 
educes total profit from production, the firm’s profit share increases at the expense of the 
ndividual worker as saved hiring costs surpass the reduced profits to the firm from increased 
mployment. Thus by taking account of the wage curve and the property that wages are 
epressed by higher employment, the firm settles for a higher allocation of labor in 
roduction than under the efficient outcome.   
t
w
t
r
i
e
d
p
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s the firm’s incentive to overhire is pushed by a potentially increased share of the 
rofit from production, this overhiring effect is reduced with the degree of product market 
ompetition. If the degree of competition increases, the profit from production is reduced as 
he firm’s market power diminish, and so follows the incentive to overhire. This is easily 
onfirmed by equation (21): As , the right hand side is reduced to , which is the 
arginal product under free competition.  m
F
w
a
                                             
irm-level equilibrium under individual bargaining is given by the intersection of the 
age curve from the bargaining process and the labor demand curve from the firm’s optimal 
djustment. Combining the two curves from equation (19) and equation (21) we achieve an 
 
11
w
 As the model of Ebell and Haefke (2006) includes several labor market imperfections, an efficient adjustment of the firm  
ith respect to labor does not necessarily imply that the social and private retun from production coincide. 
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implicit expression for the long run equilibrium employment in firm  under individual 
bargaining: 
  (22) 
Using the property that the , the explicit employment level is given by: 
  (23) 
And finally, by inserting firm-level equilibrium employment from equation (22) into the 
wage curve, we obtain the individual bargaining wage in equilibrium: 
  (24) 
It’s clear from equation (24) that  the individuals net bargaining wage increases in the 
reservation value of unemployment , i.e. the minimum compensation that an 
unemployed individual require to give up search.  Yet the surplus of the worker is not 
directly affected by the value of unemployment as it does not change the marginal value of 
the worker to the firm. We see this easily by inserting the individual bargaining wage from 
equation (24) into the expression of the worker’s surplus:12 
  (25) 
2.6.2 Collective Bargaining 
Under collective bargaining the coalition of workers negotiate together with the firm 
both over the number of workers to hire and the wage for all employed workers; hence the 
single firm can no longer decide by itself on the optimal number of vacancies to open each 
period. If the firm and employed workers happen to disagree, the firm is dissolved. Thus the 
                                              
12 Still the individual bargaining wage can be affected indirectly through changes in tax rates and the labor market 
tightness. 
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collective bargaining process for firm  can be represented by the s
bargaining problem: 
 
tandard generalized Nash 
 (26) 
Here  reflects the bargaining power of the coalition of workers and  reflects the 
bargaining power of the firm. The workers surplus is given by equat
firm 
ion (4) and the value of 
 is given by equation (8). In steady state the value of firm  is given by: 
  (27) 
Solving the barging problem with respect to the number of employed workers and 
we obtain the following first order conditions: 
the wage 
:  (28) 
:  (29) 
Combing equation (28) and (29) we can easily solve for employment i
equilibrium, given implicitly by: 
 
n firm-level 
 (30) 
From equation (30) it follows that the collective bargaining outcome is efficient: The firm 
a he marginal cost of hiring one 
more worker.   
 The explicit steady state employment level is given by: 
 
djusts production such that the marginal revenue equals t
 (31) 
By inserting into equation (28), we obtain the collective bargaining wage: 
  (32) 
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There exists no overhiring effect under collective bargaining, as the firm lacks the wage 
externality to increase its own surplus by hiring more workers. The surplus to both the firm 
and workers are given by a profit share, reflecting the workers joint power to shut down 
production in the case of failed negotiations. The profit share is determined by the collective 
bargaining wage given by equation (32). As the surplus for both parties are monotonically 
increasing in the total profit from the production of good , it follows that both workers and 
the firm have the same coinciding incentive to maximize total profit from production. Hence, 
the collective bargaining process leads to an efficient adjustment of the firm.  
         From equation (32), the collective bargaining wage is also increasing in the reservation 
value of employment. Thus both under individual and collective bargaining, a higher value 
of unemployment imply increased wage demand in the bargaining process. But the worker 
surplus from collective bargaining differs from that of individual bargaining, as it clearly 
depends on the value of unemployment: 
  (33) 
The difference follows from the properties of the two bargaining wages: Under individual 
bargaining the worker surplus reflects the marginal value of the worker to the firm, which  
workers are rewarded for through the bargaining wage according to the relative bargaining 
powers. When the value of unemployment increases, the value of the worker to the firm is 
not affected. Thus individual bargaining workers experience an increase in bargaining wage 
proportional to the increase in the value of unemployment, keeping the worker’s surplus 
fixed. Still the increase in wage demand reduces the total profit from production and thus the 
surplus to the individual bargaining firm.  
 Under collective bargaining the equilibrium wage reflects a profit share from the 
total surplus of production, this profit share assures that the ratio of the individual worker’s 
surplus to the firm’s average surplus equals the ratio , thus reflecting the relative 
bargaining powers of the coalition of workers and the firm. It follows that an increase in the 
reservation value of unemployment increases the collective bargaining wage through two 
main channels: First, the wage would increase to offset the reduced surplus to the worker, 
keeping the ratio of the individual worker’s surplus to the firm’s average surplus constant.  
And second, the optimal employment level and production would fall as the firm faces 
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igher employment costs.13  It follows that the average income to the firm increases given 
he lower employment level from the firm’s optimal adjustment.14 Thus bargaining wage 
ncreases even further to share the extra average income between the firm and the individual 
orker.  In conclusion the total effect of the reservation value of unemployment on the 
orker’s surplus under collective bargaining is positive. And as the effect is increasing in 
he profit share of the worker, it will increase in the relative bargaining power of the 
oalition of workers and decrease in the degree of product market competition.  
iven the optimal adjustment of the collective bargaining firm, increased wage costs 
ill reduce total profits from production. Under collective bargaining the firm and the 
oalition of workers share the cost of increased unemployment benefits as each side of the 
argaining process are assigned a certain share of the total surplus from production.  
2.7 Reservation Value of Unemployment  
 The reservation value of unemployment is defined as the minimum compensation 
hat an unemployed worker requires to give up search (Pissarides, 2000), and is obtained by 
nserting the value of employment from equation (1) into the value of unemployment from 
quation (2):     
 
T
w
i
f
                                             
(34) 
hus the reservation value can also be interpreted as the average expected return on the 
orker’s human capital during search (Pissarides, 2000). The closed solution is found by 
nserting the equilibrium wages from the firm-level equilibrium of each bargaining regime 
rom equation (24) and (32) into equation (34): 
 
13
u
14
  This is confirmed by equation (31), where the optimal employment level decreases in the reservation value of 
nemployment. 
 The average income to the firm is given by  . As equation (30) can be rewritten to 
,  an increase in the value of unemployment will through the firm’s optimal 
djustment lead to a higher average income to the firm. a
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Hence, if  and all firms engage in individual bargaining the reservation value of 
unemployment equals: 
  (35) 
Or if , such that all firms engage in collective bargaining, the reservation value of 
unemployment is given by: 
 (36) 
As the necessary and sufficient condition for a job acceptance  is fulfilled for each 
bargaining wage, the reservation value is assured to be greater or equal to the level of 
unemployment benefits in both bargaining scenarios. The reservation wage also depends 
positive on future potential earnings in both bargaining economies as it reflects the average 
expected return from search. Thus higher steady state unemployment decreases the 
reservation wage as it reduces the workers probability of future jobs, whereas a higher 
steady state surplus from employment increases the reservation wage due to higher potential 
earnings both today and in the future.   
A lasting increase in unemployment benefits gives the unemployed worker more 
income to enjoy the corresponding period, and would at first sight seem to increase the 
reservation value of unemployment. But an increase in wage demand reduces the optimal 
production of both types bargaining firms, and thus there occurs an indirect effect through 
the response in equilibrium unemployment. As future potential earnings are reduced from 
increased tax rates and as both the probability of finding a job and the level of competition is 
affected by steady state employment, the total effect on the reservation value of 
unemployment is ambiguous as it clearly depends on the dominating factor. In chapter 5 I 
proceed by simulating the general equilibrium of the model for several values of the policy 
parameter , thus accounting for all possible effects from a lasting change in the degree of 
unemployment compensation. 
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3. General Equilibrium 
o analyze the total effect from a lasting change in the level of unemployment 
enefits, it’s crucial to determine the total change in all endogenous variables of the model 
or the given parameters  and the general equilibrium conditions.  By 
irst focusing on the outcome of each bargaining institution separately, taking the mix of 
argaining institutions as given, I will later determine how a given 
f
b  can be supported by the 
quilibrium outcomes of the model. e
For each possible level of the policy parameter , equilibrium wages and employment 
evels satisfies the firm-level equilibrium conditions given by equations (23)  an (24)  for 
ndividual bargaining firms and equations (31) and (32) for collective bargaining firms. For a 
iven mix of bargaining institutions 
l
i
g  the equilibrium labor market tightness  is pinned 
own by imposing the aggregate resource constraint: d
   
E
e
f
(37) 
quation (37) states that in general equilibrium the total income from production has to 
qual the total income in the economy. By substituting in firm-level equilibrium employment 
or each bargaining regime from equation (22) and (30), the final equilibrium condition for 
 is given by: 
     
38) 
 
(
Setting  and inserting the reservation value of unemployment, we finally obtain the 
eneral equilibrium condition for an economy where all firms engage in individual 
argaining: 
g
b
  (39) 
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The general equilibrium condition pins down  as a function of the exogenously chosen 
policy parameter .  Equation (39) is monotonically increasing in the labor market tightness. 
Thus to secure the existence of an equilibrium solution it is necessary to limit the possible 
values of unemployment benefits: 
  (40) 
Likewise, by setting  and inserting the reservation value of unemployment, we obtain 
the general equilibrium condition for an economy where all firms engage in collective 
bargaining:  
  (41) 
In this scenario the existence of equilibrium is guaranteed if: 
  (42)   
Restriction (40) and (42) reflect the necessary condition that the individual worker can’t 
receive more as unemployed than he would contribute to the economy by working in a firm.  
As    approaches its upper limit, unemployed agents exhaust the employed workers through 
higher taxation and in the end the economy shuts down. 
3.1 The Free Entry Condition 
Following the model of Ebell and Haefke (2006), where the outcome of bargaining 
institutions depends crucially on the degree of product market competition, I also 
endogenize the level of competition in the long run economy to account for the possible 
effects that unemployment benefits might have on the degree of competition in the two 
bargaining regimes. Thus in the long run economy firms are assumed to exploit all profit 
opportunities from entering the market, driving profit net of entry costs down to zero. For 
every value of   the degree of competition  is no longer given, but is endogenously 
determined by the free entry-condition: 
  (43) 
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he condition states that the total cost of entering the market has to equal the steady state 
quilibrium value of the firm for each type of bargaining institution  .  The cost is 
ivided into total barrier cost of entry d  and the cost of hiring enough workers to cover the 
teady state employment level. As the firm’s value decreases and the cost of entry increases 
n the degree of competition, there exists a unique long run equilibrium solution for 
s
i  for 
ach possible value of e , where profit net of entry costs equals zero.  
3.2  The Unemployment Rate 
By determining the labor market tightness for a given   , the equilibrium 
nemployment rate is obtained by imposing the steady state condition: The flow of 
ndividuals into employment has to equal the flow out of employment to maintain a constant 
ate of unemployment (Pissarides, 2000): 
u
i
r
  (44) 
T
u
hus equation (44) can be rewritten as the Bevridge curve, which determines the steady state 
nemployment rate in term of the transition rates  and  : 
  (45) 
 For every possible value of  the general equilibrium conditions now determine a 
nique unemployment rate. And noticeable, is that for a given u  unemployment only 
epends negative on the labor market tightness d  which equals the ratio of vacancies to 
nemployed searching workers. u
 T
e
i
j
he rest of equilibrium variables are found as follows:  The number of workers in the 
conomy N is for convenience normalized to 1. Thus, for a given mix of bargaining 
nstitutions the condition that the number of employed workers has to equal the sum of filled 
ob from the two bargaining regimes simplifies to: .  Given 
 and  we can further solve for aggregate output and equilibrium prices. The only 
ariable left to determine is the mix of bargaining institution v . In Chapter 4, I connect the 
utcome of employment, bargaining wages and worker surplus to the choice of bargaining 
egime, thus making 
o
r  an endogenous variable in the model.   
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3.3 Search and Efficiency 
An efficient allocation of search intensity is one where the social and private return 
from search coincide (Moen, 1997).  In an uncoordinated labor market with frictions, the 
probability of finding or filling a job does not only depend on the search intensity of the 
individual agent, but also the search intensity of the other agents in the market: During 
search an agent’s search intensity will affect the opposite party positive, but the same type 
negative (Moen, 1997). This is easily confirmed by the matching function of the Mortensen-
Pissarides search friction model which reflects the technology that brings together 
unemployed workers and vacant jobs. For example: If a firm chooses to increase the search 
intensity by stating more vacancies, it follows from the matching function that the 
probability for a worker to find a job increases, whereas the probability for a firm to fill a 
vacancy will decrease. To achieve an efficient allocation of search, the private gain to both 
firm and workers should reflect these search externalities. Hence, in a labor market with 
friction, an efficient search allocation is the one that integrates the search externalities in the 
wage bargaining process between firm and worker.   
When the wage setting occur prior to search, as in the ex-ante wage bargaining model 
of Moen (1997), firms set wages in competition with other firms profitably as a measure to 
attract employees. Thus firms can influence the search behavior of workers, and wages 
reflect the search externalities in the labor market.  Under ex-post wage bargaining, 
however, there is no such mechanism as firm and worker settle the wage after the match is 
made. Wages are still endogenous, but the matching technology is now outside the model of 
the bargaining process (Hosios, 1990). Under ex-post wage bargaining, wages only reflect 
the relative negotiation power of the worker and the surplus from the match. Thus search 
externalities are not integrated in the ex-post wage bargaining process and wages do not 
contribute any signaling or reflect the allocation of search. Hosios (1990) and Pissarides 
(2000) suggest a solution to the efficiency problem of ex-post wage bargaining by 
connecting the social gain of the match and the private return from participating in the 
matching process: If the elasticity of the matching function equals the relative bargaining 
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ower of the worker, then search externalities are integrated in the bargaining process, 
eading to an efficient allocation of search intensity.15  
till, the condition of Hosios (1990) and Pissarides (2000) is only fulfilled by a 
oincidence of the parameter values in the model. In contrast, in Moen’s (1997) ex-ante 
age bargaining model it is the intentional structure of the labor market itself that secure 
earch efficiency.     
 Why does the efficiency condition not necessarily apply to the ex-post wage 
argaining model of Ebell and Haefke (2006)? The efficiency condition of Hosios (1990) 
nd Pissarides (2000) refers to an economy where all other market failures than search 
xternalities are ruled out. This assures that the social surplus from the match coincide with 
he private surplus that is shared according to the bargaining process. Since the model of 
bell and Haefke (2006) includes several market imperfections, as the monopolistic 
ehavior of the firm and distorting taxes on income to finance the expenditure of 
nemployment compensation to the government, the efficiency condition of Hosios (1990) 
nd Pissarides (2000) will not connect the social gain and the private return from 
articipating in the matching process. Thus we conclude that the ex-post wage bargaining 
rocess in the model of Ebell and Haefke (2006) does not necessarily lead to an efficient 
llocation of search intensity.  
4. Stable Bargaining Institution 
ntil now the outcomes of the model have been derived for a given mix of 
argaining institutions  . In this section I connect the outcome of employment, worker’s 
urplus and wages to the choice of bargaining regime, making s  an endogenous variable of 
he model.  t
S
e
e
                                             
olving the model numerically, the necessary requirements for a symmetric Nash 
quilibrium will help us settle the choice of each bargaining regime taking account of all 
ffects from a lasting change in unemployment benefits. I outline here the necessary 
 
15
th
 The models of Hosios (1990) and Pissarides (2000) include different features, but both have the crucial assumption that 
e matching process is characterized by a constant return to scale matching function. 
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 in 
individual bargaining or an economy where all firms engage in collective bargaining.      
rst 
en 
uffer from layoffs are 
random and not revealed prior to the switch of bargaining regime.  
4
ling of 
en 
ell 
 
 of bargaining 
condition for a symmetric Nash equilibrium. I will further take advantage of these criteria in 
the model simulation when analyzing how a shift in unemployment compensation affects the 
mix of bargaining institution, either when considering an economy where all firms engage
 Ebell and Haefke (2006) outline necessary conditions for Nash equilibrium by fi
considering the relative gain or loss in worker surplus from deviating to the alternative 
bargaining process. Here, I explain briefly a set of necessary conditions for symmetric Nash 
equilibrium, where the individual worker will first take account of potential layoffs and th
consider the relative gain or loss from switching to the alternative bargaining institution 
(Ebell and Haefke 2008). However, I assume that the workers who s
.1 The Choice of Bargaining Institution 
 As firms can increase their own surplus by overhiring under individual bargaining, 
initially new firms will choose the individual bargaining process when entering the market to 
guarantee a higher surplus from production (Ebell and Haefke, 2008). But as workers in each 
firm have the opportunity to merge the individual settling of wages to a collective sett
both wage and firm-level employment, workers may decide if profitable to switch to 
collective wage bargaining. This makes the choice of bargaining institution a free and 
collective choice of the workers in the model. I assume further that all workers in a giv
firm have to agree unanimously on which bargaining institution to choose. Due to the 
assumption of identical agents in the economy, there occurs no situation of mixed opinions 
on the optimal bargaining process as all agents have the same coinciding preferences (Eb
and Haefke, 2006). Thus I only consider the preferences of the individual worker when
settling the necessary requirements for a stable bargaining institution in the economy. 
Further, I only consider the necessary requirements for Nash equilibrium
institution  compared to the alternative bargaining institution , where  are two
distinct bargaining institutions. In chapter 5 I apply this general setting
 
 to the model 
simulation of both the collective and individual bargaining economy. 
 labor 
  I assume that all firms in the model are atomistic with respect to the economy, so 
that any individual decision of an arbitrary firm will have no impact on the aggregate
market tightness  (Ebell and Haefke, 2006). Hence, when evaluating the choice of 
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b nstitutions 
corresponding to that of the potential Nash equilibrium in the economy.  
4.2
ge 
i  
s
argaining process, workers determine the outcome of both individual and collective wa
argaining for the same labor market tightness with the mix of bargaining i
 Nash Equilibrium with one Type of Bargaining Firm  
To determine the necessary conditions for an economy where all firms either enga
n individual- or collective bargaining, we need to settle the necessary conditions for a 
ymmetric Nash equilibrium. A bargaining institution  is a symmetric Nash equilibrium if it 
s not optimal for the worker in an arbitrary firm to deviate to bargaining process i , given 
hat all other firms engage in bargaining process t  (Ebell and Haefke, 2006). As all workers 
re assumed to be identical, we only determine the necessary conditions that one age t f
t optimal not to deviate from bargaining process 
a n ind 
i   given a labor market tightness , 
reflecting that all the other agents adopt the same bargaining process .  
s l 
worker will first consider the potential change in firm-level employment as a second key 
variable before making his decision.  
 Intuitively the worker prefers the bargaining institution which gives the highest 
urplus from work. But as a switch of bargaining regime may involve layoffs, the individua
If the switch from bargaining regime  to bargaining regime  does not involve 
ayoffs, the individual worker will only consider the relative change in worker’s surplus,
e is indifferent to the otential extra workers. Thus, for a given long-run 
quilibrium where  
l  as 
h  utility of the p
e   for firm , bargaining institution  is a symmetric Nash 
equilibrium only if: 
           
(46) 
b
t
From Chapter 2 the value of unemployment depends only on the total mix of 
argaining institutions and not on the workers previous choice of bargaining regime. Given 
hat the reservation wage is based on the same labor market tightness , the worker surpl
s monotonically increasing in bargaining wage. Thus instead of comparing the relative 
us 
i
surplus from employment, we can compare the relative wage from the bargaining process: 
 (47)   
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It follows that equation (47) coincide with the necessary restriction for symmetric 
Nash equilibrium of bargaining institution  depicted in equation (46), given that 
.  
Alternatively, if the switch of bargaining regime involves layoffs, workers will take 
account of the probability of becoming unemployed. As agents are assumed to be risk 
neutral, the individual worker will only deviate from the initial bargaining institution  if the 
expected surplus from employment is greater in the alternative bargaining process . 
Formally, for a given long-run equilibrium where   for firm , bargaining 
institution  is only a symmetric Nash equilibrium if:  
  (48) 
In Chapter 5 I focus separately on the conditions for a symmetric Nash equilibrium in 
the collective and individual bargaining economy by applying the general conditions stated 
here for bargaining process . I always consider the employment criteria first, and then 
depending on the relative employment level I proceed to consider the wage criteria given by 
equation (47), or the expected utility criteria given by equation (48). There are several 
general equilibriums to consider as I for each bargaining economy check numerically for all 
possible degrees of unemployment compensation. Given the same labor market tightness, 
two different levels of unemployment benefits can show a different optimal choice of 
bargaining process. Only for the level where the individual worker chooses to stick to the 
original bargaining economy can we conclude that the bargaining process is a symmetric 
Nash equilibrium for that level of unemployment benefits. It is also possible that there exist 
two symmetric Nash equilibriums, one in each bargaining economy, for one level of 
unemployment benefits. Then the individual bargaining economy with  is the general 
equilibrium outcome of the model as firms initially choose the individual bargaining 
process. 
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4.3 Nash Equilibrium with a Mix of Bargaining Types 
ext I focus on the conditions for a Nash equilibrium with a mix of bargaining types 
n the economy. I let  denote the coverage rate of bargaining institution . Thus for  to be a 
ash equilibrium, the share of firms N  that engage in bargaining process  must find it sub-
ptimal do deviate to bargaining process o , whereas the share of firms  that engage in 
argaining process b  must find it sub-optimal to deviate to bargaining institution  (Ebell and 
aefke,2008).  I divide the conditions into two different cases (Ebell and Haefke, 2008): H
 First case: The worker surplus from bargaining process  equals the worker surplus 
rom bargaining process f . In this case no worker will find it optimal to deviate to the 
lternative bargaining process given the adjustment of all other bargaining firms. Thus a 
ufficient condition for Nash equilibrium of the mix of bargaining institution 
a
s  is: 
  (49) 
E
e
t
u
t
ven though the two bargaining wages differ, it is fully possible that the two wage levels are 
qual for a given general equilibrium. However, they do not reflect the same properties from 
he bargaining process. Under collective bargaining the wage reflects a profit share, whereas 
nder individual bargaining the wage reflects the marginal value of the worker to the firm. If 
hese values happen to coincide for a given , then we observe this in the model by equal 
argaining wages.    b
Second case: The worker surplus is higher under bargaining institution , but 
witching from bargaining institution s  to  involve job losses given the labor market 
ightness t . In addition, the expected utility from bargaining process  is at least as high as 
he expected utility from bargaining process t . Thus even though bargaining institution  
l
p
eads to the higher surplus for the individual worker, the workers that engage in bargaining 
rocess  will not find it optimal to deviate. Formally: 
  
  (50) 
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The second case shows how workers do not only consider the relative wage level as 
the determining factor of bargaining choice as workers do not know the real outcome and 
which workers who suffers from potential layoffs before after the switch of bargaining 
process. Even though the worker’s wage could actually increase, workers abstain from 
switching bargaining regime as the expected utility is negative.  
In the quantitative section of the next chapter, I analyze how the choice of bargaining 
regime depends of the level of unemployment benefits by changing the exogenously given 
policy parameter . I mainly focus on the possibility of a symmetric Nash equilibrium either 
supporting the individual or collective bargaining economy. By simulating the two boarder 
cases of the model, I check numerically the necessary requirements for a symmetric Nash 
equilibrium. Given that neither the collective nor the individual bargaining economy is 
supported as a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the model, the conditions for Nash 
equilibrium of bargaining economies with a mix of bargaining types illustrates the 
possibility for alternative bargaining economies.     
5. Simultating the Effects of Unemployment 
Benefits 
In this chapter I proceed by carrying out the policy experiment: I simulate the model 
described in Chapter 2 for several levels of the exogenously chosen policy parameter . I 
begin by explaining how the model is calibrated to match German long run data using the 
collective bargaining version of the model. In the quantitative section, I determine the 
individual bargaining version using the obtained parameters from the calibration. Next, I 
summarize the quantitative results from the model simulation and examine the equilibrium 
response of the policy experiment in both bargaining economies. The simulation provides 
important insight on the linkage between unemployment benefits and the wage bargaining 
process between firm and workers. Taking account of the government's budget constraint 
and the monopolistic behavior of the firm, the simulation provides more than a partial 
analysis of the labor market by illustrating the steady state equilibrium response in the key 
variables of the model.  
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5.1 Calibration  
he model is calibrated using the collective bargaining version of the model to reflect 
he high coverage of collective agreements in Germany. In the calibration and simulation of 
he model, I take advantage of the software package Matlab. The periods of the model is set 
o one month. To calibrate the model we need some baseline values, these are set to match 
uggestions in past literature on search and matching framework and to match stylized labor 
arket data from Germany. All parameters are reported in Table 1.   
o simplify I normalize as Ebell and Haefke (2006) the level of technology  to 
nity. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2000) report that earlier studies which converged on a 
obb-Douglas matching function satisfying constant return to scale reported a coefficient on 
nemployment in the range 0.5-0.7.  Abowd and Allain (1996) estimated from private 
rench industry the employee’s average bargaining power to be about 0.4. Likewise Yashiv 
2001) suggests from estimation using aggregate Israeli labor market data that the worker’s 
argaining power is around 0.4. For lack on better information on German relative 
argaining power I set 
u
C
u
F
(
b
b  0.5 to match the suggestion from the literature and fulfill 
oen’s criteria for making ex-post wage bargaining a realistic feature of the model (see 
ection 1.1). As the elasticity of the matching function equals the relative bargaining power 
f the worker, the model also fulfills Pissarides (2000) and Hosios (1990) condition on 
earch efficiency. But as explained in section 3.3: In an economy with other labor market 
mperfections the condition does not necessarily lead to efficiency. 
M
s
o
s
i
A
b
l
t
r
s one of the main targets of the analysis is to capture the implications of the shift in 
enefit entitlements, I use long-run data for Germany reported up until the year 2005.  The 
ong run unemployment rate and labor market tightness are chosen to match data reported by 
he Deutsche Bundesbank during the period 1991-2004:  I set the long run unemployment 
ate  = 9.9 %, and the labor market tightness based on monthly data of total vacancies and 
otal unemployed workers equal to  t  = 0.10. The interest rate measure is also based on 
ata from the Deutsche Bundesbank and is set to 0.0033 to reflect the approximate 4 % 
nnual interest rate level during the 1990s. The monthly probability of firm exit 
d
a  is set to 
.5 %, thus to match the average five-year survival probability by small firms that entered 
erman manufacturing industries between 1979 and 1982 reported by Wagner (1994).  In a 
tationary environment, the inverse of 
0
G
s  (the probability that a worker find a job within a 
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given period) is also the mean duration of unemployment (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2000). 
As the model is restricted to steady state, I set  = 8.75 to match the average mean 
duration of unemployment in Germany measured in months from the period 1998-2004 
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2007), which implies a job finding rate of 0.114. Thus the scaling 
parameter of the matching function follows from the definition: . The 
exogenous total separation rate is obtained from the Bevridge curve, which relates  to the 
long run unemployment rate and unemployment duration. And finally, by setting  = 0.0126 
from equation (45), the probability that a match is destroyed  = 0.0076 follows from the 
expression of the total separation rate .   
From the definition of the worker’s value of unemployment given by equation (3),   
is defined as the real return an unemployed worker enjoys during search. As  in praxis may 
include other real return than the unemployment benefits from any unpaid leisure activities 
such as home production, it occurs a problem by estimating the real value of   from the 
data. In addition, prior to 2005, there existed two types of unemployment benefits in 
Germany dependent on both the characteristic of the individual and the unemployment 
duration: Unemployment insurance (U1) which was paid out for a limited period and 
depended positively on the individual’s pervious work-history and age. When the 
individual’s U1 benefits runs out, he may be entitled to receive unemployment assistance 
(UA) benefits, which though has a lower replacement rate than the  U1 benefits is not time-
limited (Wolff , 2003). As the depicted model only has one variable determining the level of 
unemployment benefits given by  (as all individual are assumed to be identical in the 
model) and we are only concerned with the potential relative change in the level of benefits 
entitlement, I choose a net replacement rate target to calibrate the unemployment benefit 
level in the long run version of the model. The net replacement rate is set to 64 % to match 
the reported level by OECD during the period 2001-2004. Further, the payroll tax and 
income tax are set to equal magnitude, i.e.  , and chosen such that the total 
unemployment benefit expenditure is financed each period according to equation (1). The 
two tax rates are not representative for the more complex tax-system in Germany which 
includes several other types of taxes. This is a weakness of the model when calibrating it to 
German data. Still, in the model simulation the two tax rates provide important insight on 
how firms and workers are affected when the cost of unemployment compensation increases. 
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he cost of stating a vacancy and the degree of competition are finally pinned down 
y imposing the long run general equilibrium condition and the long run free entry condition 
rom the collective bargaining version of the model, given respectively by equation (41) and 
43).  Thus the total barrier cost of entry is jet to be determined: I follow the procedure of 
bell and Haefke (2006) and divide  into a regulatory delay  and entry fees  as a share 
f aggregate monthly income o : 
  (51) 
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jankov, et. al. (2002) reports the cost in order to obtain all licenses and permits required for 
ntry as a fraction of GDP in 1999 to be 15.7 %. In addition I use an index derived by 
onseca, et. al. (2001) based on a study by Logotech on business start-up costs in OECD 
ountries in 1997 to determine the regulatory delay:16 The index measure weights the 
umber of days on average that a new company need to complete the necessary number of 
rocedures before start-up, for Germany it is estimated to be 55.2 working days (Ebell and 
aefke, 2006).        
.2        Quantitative Results  
n this section I summarize the main results from the model simulation. I solve for 
oth the collective and individual bargaining version using the obtained parameter values 
rom the calibration reported in Table 1. The possible values of  are chosen exogenously, 
epresenting the government's policy instrument in the model. To provide a bare minimum 
f survival for unemployed workers 
r
o  is restricted to be non-negative. The upper limit is 
etermined by restriction (40) and (42), thus securing the existence of a general equilibrium 
olution in the model (see section 3). 
d
s
                                              
1
w
p
a
 
6 Fonseca, et. al. (2001) reports for Germany 10 number of procedures required and 16 weeks given by 80 
orking days as the average time to set up a company. Thus the index that combines the number of days and 
rocedures ((days + procedures)/(average procedures /day))/2) is measured to 55.2 days as reported by Ebell 
nd Haefke (2006).  
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I begin by comparing the labor market outcome of each bargaining regime for a 
given degree of product market competition. Next, I simulate the model for several degrees 
of competition and explore the importance of the firm’s monopoly power when considering 
the effects of a lasting change in unemployment benefits. I follow up, by introducing the free 
entry condition in the open market and thereby pin down the degree of long-run competition 
for every level of unemployment benefits. Thus I focus on the potential indirect effects of 
the adjustment in product market competition compared to the direct effects from the initial 
change in unemployment benefits. Finally, in the last sub-section, I examine which 
bargaining institution that emerges endogenously for every possible level of unemployment 
benefits, and then check numerically if the different properties of the bargaining processes 
potentially change the bargaining process itself.  
 
5.2.1 The Equilibrium Response 
The steady state equilibrium response for all possible levels of unemployment 
benefits are reported in Figure 2. The degree of product market competition is kept constant 
and equal to 11.95, the level calibrated from the collective bargaining version of the model. 
Real wage after tax refers to  in the model description and real wage cost per 
worker to firm  is given by  . The two curves in Figure 2 refer to the alternative 
bargaining economies, where all firms either engage in collective or individual bargaining. 
Focusing on Germany, the collective bargaining curve illustrates the steady state outcome 
from the model of a lasting change in unemployment benefits, whereas the individual 
bargaining curve shows the alternative outcome if all firms were to engage in individual 
bargaining given the parameter values reported in Table 1. 
According to Figure 2, both bargaining versions illustrate the same qualitative 
response in labor market outcome from a lasting change in unemployment benefits:  As 
unemployment benefits increase, unemployment and tax-rates rise accompanied by a fall in 
both bargaining after-tax real wage and worker surplus. For both bargaining economies real 
profits to the firm decrease, whereas labor costs increase with the degree of unemployment 
compensation.  
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follows from the individual bargaining process. In contrast to collective bargaining, 
individual bargaining firm
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f It follows that the higher labor costs from 
increased unemployment compensation are reflected in the increasing unemployment rates 
in both bargaining versions of the m
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rates have to increase to finance the higher expenditure of unemployment compensation, 
thus leaving the remaining workers with a lower after-tax income and an even higher cost of 
labor to the firm
As expected from theory, an increase in unemployment benefits increases the 
orkers wage demand in the bargaining process by making the agents more selective. Based 
n the model this implies higher labor costs to both type of bargaining firms, who adjust by
ecreasing production and employment. It is important to separate how this decision is made 
n each type of bargaining firm: Under collective bargaining this is a joint decision of the 
irm and the coalition of workers. They decide in the bargaining process to reduce firm-level 
mployment, as wage demand increases, in order to maximize total profits from production. 
nder individual bargaining the reduction in firm-level employment is only a decision
y the firm. Upon making this decision the firm takes account of the bargaining w
s only maximize the value of the firm’s profit share.   
Given a constant degree of product market competition the number of firms in th
conomy is considered fixed. Thus the adjustments in equilibrium employment only arise 
rom the individual adjustment of the firms. 
odel.  
As an increase in steady state unemployment decreases both today’s and future 
otential earnings for all workers, the natural response in the model is a reduction in the 
eservation value of unemployment. This follows from the interpretation that the reservatio
age reflects the average expected return on the worker’s human capital during search. But
s the reservation wage also reflects the minimum compensation an unemployed worker 
equires to give up search, it is also reasonable to expect a rise in the reservation wage as 
nemployment benefits increase. The model simulation illustrates that the effect of inc
teady state unemployment dominates the effect of extra income to unemployed workers in 
oth bargaining economies as the reservation wage is decreasing with the degree of 
nemployment compensation. Thus unemployment benefits lead to reduced wage pres
hrough higher unemployment which counteracts the initial increase in wage demand in the 
argaining process. The employment mechanism is further strengthened through the 
overnment’s budget constraint: As agents move from employment to unemployment, tax 
.  
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mand in the bargaining process. Thus the model 
suggests that the size of the response depends crucially on the firm’s optimal adjustment and  
workers’ relative bargaining strength. 
 the 
 
ividual 
s, 
rates a small reduction in both individual bargaining 
worker surplus and real profits as unemployment benefits increase compared to the almost 
flat collective bargaining response. 
els 
 
ment 
The model simulation illustrates that the initial increase in wage demand raises 
employment cost for both types of bargaining firms. Still, the rise in unemployment 
combined with the needed increase in tax rates leads to a decreasing level of real wage fo
both bargaining economies. However, the labor market response is driven by the firms profit 
maximization and the workers wage de
Figure 2 illustrate the decisive impact of bargaining institution when considering
quantitative reaction in labor market outcomes. The collective bargaining economy shows a
strong response in both real wage and unemployment rates compared to the ind
bargaining economy. And noticeable, is the almost constant collective bargaining surplu
whereas the reservation value of unemployment mirrors the strong reaction in 
unemployment. With individual bargaining the equilibrium response in all variables is 
relatively small. Still, Figure 2 illust
Looking at unemployment rates, the over hiring effect of individual bargaining firms 
is clearly evident: In contrast to collective bargaining, individual bargaining firms have the 
freedom to depress wages by hiring more workers, leading to a considerable lower long run 
unemployment rate in the individual bargaining version of the model for all possible lev
of unemployment benefits. As discussed by Ebell and Haefke (2006), collective bargaining
being the symmetric Nash equilibrium under high EU regulation, may explain the high 
observed unemployment rates in Europe. Likewise, we observe from the simulation of the 
German labor market a potential gain in the steady state unemployment rate from individual 
bargaining. This efficiency gain depends however crucially on the level of unemploy
benefits: Given the initial value of unemployment benefits where  = 0.57 the unemploym
rate can potentially improve from 9.9 % under collective bargaining to 4.4 % under 
individual bargaining. But as the level of unemployment bene
ent 
fits reach the significantly 
lower level of 0.3, the potential gain decreases from an unemployment rate of 5.2 % under 
collective bargaining to 3.3 % under individual bargaining.  
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p  process, are also illustrated in Figure 2. 
Even though both production and firms’ profits in the individual bargaining economy 
surpass the outcom
lower for all levels of unem
b nt 
a
h
r
b ng 
p re 
w
d
w
o
u the worker's 
surplus approximately constant reflecting the worker's profit share from production. But 
given the firm
unem
 e 
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coalition of workers bargains for the joint surplus only. The wage level is an endogenous 
v the average worker’s surplus reflecting the 
average profit share determined by the bargaining process. Thus the reduction in collective 
bargaining real wage is needed to maintain an approximately constant surplus from 
employment as the reservation wage decreases.  
The distributional effect of overhiring under individual bargaining and the joint 
ower of the workers’ in the collective bargaining
e of collective bargaining, the simulated worker surplus is considerably 
ployment benefits.  
From an employed worker's perspective the collective bargaining surplus is clearly to 
e preferred as it reflects the potential profits from the product market. Yet the efficie
djustment of the collective bargaining firm as unemployment benefits increase leads to the 
igh level of unemployment observed in Figure 2.  As unemployment benefits increase, the 
eduction of optimal employment level and profits follows. While in the individual 
argaining economy, the firms’ freedom to choose firm-level employment in the bargaini
rocess gives firms the advantage to increase their own share of the surplus by hiring mo
orkers. In this way firms earn the higher profits and the workers’ surplus decrease with the 
egree of unemployment compensation. On the other hand, from collective bargaining 
orkers are offered even more due to the increase in average profits, thus reducing the 
ptimal employment level even further. The trade off under collective bargaining is clear: As 
nemployment benefits increase, the collective bargaining process keeps 
's optimal adjustment, the relatively higher worker surplus combined with high 
ployment benefits leads to the social cost of high unemployment.  
Finally, unemployment is the key variable that explains the sharp fall in collectiv
argaining wage as unemployment benefits increase. First, the sharp increase in 
nemployment combined with the government’s budget constraint leads to an increase in tax 
ates given the higher cost of unemployment compensation. This reduces the after tax 
ncome to the working part of the economy. Second, the strong response in steady state 
nemployment due to higher labor costs is mirrored in the reservation wage, as steady state 
nemployment decreases the probability of future potential earnings. From the model the 
ariable of the model and is only adjusted to keep 
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5.2.2 The Importance of Product Market Competition 
Not only is the degree of product market competition essential for the choice of 
bargaining regime (Ebell, and Haefke, 2006), it is also an essential factor when considering 
the effect of a lasting change in unemployment benefits. As discussed in the model 
description, the surplus from collective bargaining mirrors the degree of product market 
competition: The workers' collective bargaining surplus is determined by a profit share. In 
this way the bargaining process offer high real wages at low levels of competition that 
decreases in the degree of product market competition. Whereas under individual 
bargaining, the incentive to overhire reflects the potential profits from the goods market, 
thus depending positive on the firms’ monopoly power. As the outcome of each bargaining 
regime depends crucially on the level of product market competition, it raises the question of 
how the equilibrium response of a change in benefit entitlements depends on . By 
simulating the general equilibrium response for several degrees of product market 
competition of a lasting change in unemployment benefits, I simulate respectively the 
equilibrium response of collective and individual bargaining in Figure 3 and 4, for every 
combination of  and .  
There are several aspects to be noticed from the illustration: Firstly, the strikingly flat 
response under individual bargaining compared to the efficient collective bargaining 
equilibrium outcome. As competition decreases, firms exit the market leaving the remaining 
firms with more monopoly power and thus relatively higher profits from production. It 
follows that in the collective bargaining economy, unemployment increases and workers 
demand a higher surplus to maintain a constant profit share. In the individual bargaining 
economy firms decide to overhire to secure a larger share of the increasing surplus. Thus 
individual bargaining firms hire more workers as the other firms leave the market, in the end 
keeping both employment and wages almost unaffected.  
Secondly, the distributional impact of bargaining regime is even more evident when 
we illustrate the effect of product market competition. Under collective bargaining the 
degree of competition has a strong and negative effect on worker surplus, while a change in 
unemployment benefits leaves the surplus from employment approximately constant.  It’s 
clear from Figure 3 that under collective bargaining firm and workers share the cost of 
higher unemployment benefits, in the same way they also share the gain from increased 
 41
m
i
b  
t hen 
w s to a decreasing worker surplus with the degree of 
unemployment compensation. 
o s 
s
f  
o
c tes 
that the potential gain of deregulation crucially depends on the level of unemployment 
benefits.  
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a petition due to the free entry condition and 
the stability of bargaining institution choice. 
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onopoly power to the firm. From the individual bargaining simulation the worker surplus 
s almost unaffected by the degree of competition, but is clearly decreasing in unemployment 
enefits. Thus individual bargaining firms secure the increased profits from monopoly power
hrough overhiring. Likewise, the individual bargaining firm earns the higher profits w
age demand increases; this lead
Thirdly, the sharp rise in unemployment under collective bargaining occurs as an 
utcome of both high unemployment benefits and monopoly power to the firm. Figure 3 thu
uggests that it’s neither the regulated market nor high unemployment benefits as a single 
actor alone that cause the high level of unemployment in the collective bargaining version
f the model. It follows that the degree of product market competition is essential when 
onsidering the implications of a cut in benefit entitlements. Likewise, the model illustra
In Germany the degree of product market competition as calibrated in the model i
elatively low, so the equilibrium response illustrated in Figure 2 suggests that a cut in 
enefit entitlements may be an effective cure against high unemployment rates. But to dra
he same conclusion for the long-run economy, we need first to account for the possible 
djustment in the degree of product market com
.3 The Free Entry Condition  
In long-run equilibrium the degree of product market competition is determined by 
he free entry condition: Firms will enter the market until profit net of entry costs equals 
ero, thus removing the incentive for more firms to join the market. As profit decreases a
otal barrier cost increases in the degree of competition, there exists only one long run 
quilibrium solution of   for each possible level of  . Thus the potential change in produ
arket competition depends indirectly on the lasting change in unemployment benefits 
hrough the equilibrium outcomes of firms entry cost and profits: When profit surpasses 
ntry costs, firms will enter the market leading to an increase in product market competition. 
lternatively, when a shift in unemployment benefits leads to negative net profits, firms will 
ct 
m
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with tim
The barrier cost of entry in the model reflects the time and investment needed by the 
individual firm to establish itself in the market. Following the procedure of Ebell and Haefke 
(2006), the cost is divided into a regulatory delay and fees which are determined as a share 
of aggregate monthly income. Hence, a decrease in unemployment does not only lead to a 
higher  
e be pushed out of the market, thus increasing the long-run monopoly power of the 
individual firm. 
level of long run production and profit in the model, but it also increases the cost of
entry to the firm. 
Figure 5 and 6 illustrate the equilibrium response of profits and entry costs from a 
lasting change in unemployment benefits. The first row of Figure 5 refers to the initial case 
where  11.95, suggesting the potential adjustment in the long run degree of competition. 
In the collective bargaining economy, the free entry condition is fulfilled for the initial level 
of unemployment benefits from the calibration where 0.57. The second row illustrates 
the absolute value of profit net of entry costs in general equilibrium for several degrees of
product market competition. We see that profit net of entry costs is positive for low levels of 
competition in both bargaining economies. As the degree of competition increases, profit net 
of entry costs falls. When profit net of entry costs equals zero, then an increase in 
competition leads to negative values, which in the Figure 5 is illustrated by a rise in the 
 
absolute value of profit net of entry costs. Thus Figure 5 determines the long-run degree of 
competition where profit net of entry costs equals zero. Figure 6 illustrates separately real 
profits and entry costs to the firm in both bargaining economies as a function of both  and  
.   
As individual bargaining firms can increase profit by overhiring, the degree of 
competition is considerable higher than the degree calibrated from the collective bargaining 
econom ng as y. This is confirmed by Figure 5: Bargaining firms will enter the market as lo
profit net of entry cost is positive, leading to a higher degree of long-run competition.  
From the collective bargaining economy the sharp fall in unemployment as  
decreases is followed by a rise in entry costs. Figure 6 illustrates how entry costs in the 
collective bargaining economy mirror the level of unemployment depicted in Figure 3. As 
the adjustment of the collective bargaining firm is always efficient and both workers and 
firm share the cost of increased unemployment compensation, Figure 6 illustrates an almost 
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lat response in profits over the level of unemployment benefits. Thus collective bargaining 
irms experience a higher rise in entry cost than profits as  falls for a given value , leading 
to the decreasing degree of product market competition as observed in Figure 5.  
c
i
e of competition and thus 
reduces the inefficiency in the individual bargaining economy. 
5.2.4 T
u t 
m  
c
r  the adjustment of product market competition as 
firms may enter or leave the market.  
d
The paradox of the model simulation is noticeable: The efficient response of the 
ollective bargaining firm as unemployment benefits fall is the same factor that causes the 
nefficiency of increased monopoly power in the product market. Likewise, the overhiring 
ffect from individual bargaining firms causes the higher degree 
he Equilibrium Response of the Open Market    
Figure 7 illustrates the general equilibrium response of a lasting change in 
nemployment benefits when the model simulation accounts for the adjustment in produc
arket competition. We still observe the same qualitative equilibrium response from a
hange in unemployment benefits as observed in Figure 2.  But now the equilibrium 
esponse in unemployment also reflects
In the collective bargaining economy a cut in unemployment benefits reduces the 
egree of product market competition.17 Thus firms are pushed out of the market as  falls. 
he remaining firms experience lower labor costs combined with more monopoly power; 
aturally they adjust by increasing steady state production. It is clear from Figure 7 that the 
ncreased production from lower labor costs dominates the decreased production fro
roduct market competition, as steady state unemployment in Figure 7 falls when 
nemployment compensation is reduced. In the individual bargaining economy the positive 
hift in competition is constant for all levels of unemployment benefits. Hence, the decrease
n wage demand implies that
T
n
i m lower 
p
u
s  
i  unemployment falls, reflecting the adjustment of production 
within the individual firm. 
                                              
17  Given the initial value of  0,57 calibrated for the German long-run economy, the collective bargaining economy has 
he same labor market outcome in Figure 7 as illustrated in Figure 2. Thus I only consider the implication of a cut in 
nemployment compensation, as the two figures converge for high levels of unemployment benefits when considering the 
utcome of the collective bargaining economy. 
t
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Figure 7 illustrates a change in the size of equilibrium response in the collective 
bargaining economy due to the adjustment of product market competition. As a decrease in 
unemployment benefits now is followed by an increase in the firm’s monopoly power, the 
profit maximizing firm and workers experience an even higher return as unemployment 
benefits falls. Thus Figure 7 illustrates a stronger response in firm’s profits and the worker’s 
surplus compared to the equilibrium response depicted in Figure 2. The equilibrium response 
in unemployment is, however, weaker due to the decreasing degree of product market 
competition: As unemployment benefits falls, the increased equilibrium production from the 
individual firm due to lower labor costs is slowed down as the degree of product market 
competition decreases. 
Under individual bargaining, the labor market experience the same shift in the degree 
of product market competition for all levels of unemployment benefits. From Figure 4 a shift 
in competition is met by a flat response in labor market outcome to the worker. As explained 
in the previous section, the overhiring effect under individual bargaining decreases in 
product market competition and thus counteracts the increased production from firms 
entering the market. In conclusion, the shift in labor market outcome from opening the 
market is relatively small in the individual bargaining economy compared to the shift in 
product market competition.   
Due to the relatively weaker response in collective bargaining unemployment 
compared to the closed market, the adjustment in product market competition enhances the 
gain from the individual bargaining alternative for low levels of unemployment 
compensation. The negative shift in the individual bargaining outcome secures a larger gain 
for all levels of unemployment benefits.  Given the initial value of unemployment benefits 
from the calibration where 0.57, the unemployment rate can now improve from 9.9 % 
under collective bargaining to 4.3% under individual bargaining. For the significantly lower 
level of unemployment compensation where 0.3, the potential gain decreases to 5.7 % 
under collective bargaining compared to 3.3% under individual bargaining. Thus Figure 7 
illustrates a larger gain in unemployment from individual bargaining when the model 
simulation account for the indirect effect of product market competition.  
To summarize: The same qualitative reaction in labor market outcomes from a lasting 
change in unemployment benefits can still be observed when we adjust for the degree of 
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roduct market competition as in the equilibrium response illustrated in Figure 2. Under bo
argaining regimes a cut in unemployment bene
Also when we take account of product market competition, the potential change in 
abor market outcome is still considerably stronger under collective bargaining due to the
orkers' joint power in the negotiation process and the efficient adjustment of the firm. 
igure 7 illustrates the trade-off concerning the choice bargaining regime: Under individual 
argaining employment appears stable, but with the cost of a relatively small surplus t
orker. Whereas under collective bargaining the worker maintains a higher surplus 
eflecting the profit share and the firm’s monopoly power in the product market. But
he firm's optimal 
Collective Bargaining Stability 
Initially the model was calibrated to reflect the high coverage of collective 
greements in Germany. For minor changes in the level of unemployment benefits the 
ollective bargaining curve may be a good approximation of the reaction to a policy change 
n unemployment benefits. But to draw any conclusion to the German labor market from a 
onsiderable reduction in benefit entitlements, we first need to consider the stability of eac
ng regime and the potential indirect effect of a change in bargaining institution.  
By endogenizing the choice of bargaining institution, I proceed to check numerically 
ow the model simulation fulfills the necessary requirements for Nash equilibriums as stated 
n Chapter 4. Figure 8 illustrates the three criteria the individual worker will take account of 
hen considering the choice of optimal bargaining regime. The collective bargaining mo
efer to the long-run economy where all firms engage in collective bargaining, thus all 
urves are simulated with the labor market tightness .  Likewise, the individual bargai
odels refer to the long-run version of the model where all firms engage in individual 
argaining, making the labor market tightness equal to 
ning 
m
b . Each figure shows the outcome 
he individual worker achieves if the firm sticks to the dominating bargaining process
conomy. It also illustrates the outcome if the individual firm were to deviate to the 
lternative bargaining regime. Thus Figure 8 makes it possible to evaluate the potential gain 
t  of the 
e
a
or loss to the individual worker if the firm deviates to the alternative bargaining process, by 
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either considering the relative wage, the expected utility or the relative employment of the 
firm. 
By first focusing on the employment criteria, we can determine whether the worker 
will consider the relative wage level or the relative change in expected utility as the crucial 
factor determining the optimal bargaining institution. When all firms engage in individual 
bargaining a deviation to collective bargaining leads to an increase in the number of 
employed workers in the deviating firm, if  is less or equal to 0.44. If  exceeds 0.44, the 
collective bargaining firm will hire fewer workers than under individual bargaining. Thus 
the individual worker will consider the wage criteria if  0.44, and then switch to consider 
expected utility of importance. As both criteria show that a deviation to collective bargaining 
leads to higher expected utility, the individual worker will choose to deviate for all levels of 
unemployment benefits. If   0.44, the deviation will secure every worker in the firm 
higher utility through increased real wage. When  exceeds 0.44, the risk neutral worker is 
only secured an increase in expected utility. The actual outcome to the individual worker 
depends on the worker’s luck in the transition from individual to collective bargaining in the 
firm. In the case where a worker loses his job, he would actually be better off sticking to 
individual bargaining. But as this information is only revealed after the firm deviates, the 
risk neutral worker still chooses collective bargaining as the expected gain in utility is 
positive. Thus we can conclude from the Figure 8 that individual bargaining is not a 
symmetric Nash equilibrium in the model. 
Alternatively, when all firms engage in collective bargaining a deviation to an 
individual bargaining firm leads to a rise in the number of employees for all levels of 
unemployment benefits. Thus the individual worker only considers the wage criteria of 
importance in the collective bargaining version of the model. From Figure 8, workers will 
earn a higher wage by sticking to the collective bargaining firm until unemployment benefits 
converges to its upper limit, only then will a change of bargaining process in the individual 
firm secure the higher income.  
In conclusion, it’s clear from Figure 8 that the effect of increased employment from 
individual bargaining firms is dominated by the relatively higher worker's surplus under 
collective bargaining. In the individual bargaining version of the model, employment is high 
even if one firm chooses to deviate, thus the worker will prefer the higher surplus secured 
from the collective bargaining process. In the collective bargaining economy, however, the 
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ncrease in firm employment under individual bargaining makes the worker only consider 
he relative wage. And as both types of firm base the bargaining process on the same 
quilibrium labor market tightness, collective bargaining firms maintain a higher wage due 
o the sharing rule of the surplus. Only when unemployment benefits converge to the upper 
imit and exhaust the collective bargaining economy, will the individual worker consider 
ndividual bargaining. 
5.3 Robustness Checks 
o check the robustness of my results, I proceed by varying the key targets in the 
alibration. The results are reported in Figure 9 - 16. Each figure illustrates the alternative 
quilibrium response of the open market given the new calibration target. Thus all figures 
hould be compared to Figure 7 in the previous analysis. The first column in the table 
eported to each figure, refers to the new long-run equilibrium solution from the alternative 
alibration of the model. Further, the table reports the equilibrium outcomes of both 
argaining economies when  is reduced to 0.3. 
I
d
t
c
w
R
n
 H
c
 find only a slight change of results when I vary the annual interest rate, the mean 
uration of unemployment and the labor market tightness.  For the annual interest rate and 
he mean duration of unemployment I set the values in the calibration to two alternative 
alibration targets. Varying the interest rate target shows minor effects in the model results, 
hile varying the mean duration of unemployment has an almost negligible impact. 
eplacing the labor market tightness with the median value from the data leads also to a 
egligible change in labor market outcomes. 
owever, the results are more sensitive to changes in calibration targets of entry 
osts and the probability of firm exit. In Figure 14 I reduce the regulatory delay  and entry 
ees f  respectively to 0.118 and 41.4, which is 75% of their values from the original 
alibration. This results in an increase in the degree of product market competition in the 
ndividual bargaining economy and a convergence of equilibrium outcomes in the two 
argaining economies. Further, changing the firms exit rate in Figure 15 and 16 leads to a 
oticeable reaction in individual bargaining outcome: Decreasing 
c
i
b
n  to 0.004 leads to a 
onvergence of outcomes in the individual bargaining economy to the outcomes in the c
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collective bargaining economy. Whereas increasing  to 0.006 separates the equilibrium 
outcomes of the individual bargaining economy and decreases the level of unemployment in 
the individual bargaining economy to the low level of  0,4%  when  = 0.57. The reason is 
that the firm exit rate determines the rate which firm discounts profits and entry costs (see 
section 2.1). Thus increasing the exit rate increases the discounted value of entry costs to the 
firm and makes it less profitable for firms to enter the market. This leads to the relatively 
weaker response in competition due to the free entry condition in Figure 16. Likewise, 
Figure 15 illustrates that decreasing firms exit rate leads to a stronger response in product 
market competition, especially for the individual bargaining economy. This only confirms 
the result of section 5.2.2: The equilibrium response of a change in unemployment benefits 
depends crucially on the degree of product market competition. Thus I conclude that the 
calibration and model results are sensitive to factors that influence the adjustment of product 
market competition. 
6. Conlclusion 
 Even though the policy experiment is mainly illustrative, the model simulation 
provides important insight into the linkage between unemployment benefits and the choice 
of bargaining regime. The policy experiment has three main findings: First, it illustrates the 
importance of bargaining economy when considering the size of equilibrium response. In the 
collective bargaining economy an increase in unemployment compensation is met by a 
strikingly stronger response in steady state unemployment and after tax wages compared to 
the individual bargaining economy. This follows from the collective bargaining process, 
which secures an efficient adjustment of the firm and an even distribution of the cost of 
increased wage demand between firm and workers. Under individual bargaining the firm has 
the freedom to overhire. This keeps employment relatively high even when wage demand 
increases, but at the cost of a considerably reduced surplus to individual bargaining workers 
for all degrees of unemployment compensation. Second, the degree of product market 
competition is an essential contributor to the high level of unemployment in the collective 
bargaining economy. As the worker surplus reflects the firm’s monopoly power in the 
product market, low levels of competition leads to a stronger reaction in collective 
bargaining wage and unemployment as wage demand increase. And third, even though the 
individual bargaining economy shows a weaker response in steady state unemployment for 
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institution is only a choice of the working part of the economy, collective bargaining is 
preferred as it secures a higher surplus from employment.  
me 
i
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c e social gain of lower steady 
state unemployment in the individual bargaining economy.  
i y 
a
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c  the 
f
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o
l  one 
igh levels of unemployment benefits, the workers in the model choose to form bargain
oalitions for all levels of unemployment compensation. As the choice of bargaining 
How does the result of the policy experiment relate to the recent replacement sche
n Germany, taken as a measure to active the unemployed? The replacement scheme in 
ermany involved a reduction in benefits entitlements to unemployed workers, which in the 
odel of Ebell and Haefke (2006) corresponds to a reduction in the degree of unemployment 
ompensation. As the collective bargaining economy is the preferred choice for all levels of 
nemployment benefits in the policy experiment, the model suggests that German workers 
ill also continue to form bargaining coalitions after the cut in unemployment benefits. This 
as two main implications for the German labor market: First, the model indicates that long-
un level of unemployment will fall combined with and increase in the real after-tax wag
evel. And second, the model suggests that the relative gain from a deregulation in the 
roduct market will decrease:  As unemployment falls with the degree of unemployment 
ompensation in the collective bargaining economy, so falls th
In the collective bargaining economy the model simulation suggests that the reduction 
n benefits entitlements leads to a considerable reduction in unemployment accompanied b
n increase in bargaining wage. This follows from the combination of the firm’s optimal 
djustment and the joint power of the workers in the bargaining process. However, the 
erman labor market is characterized by a high coverage of collective agreements which 
overs whole sectors or industries. Existing research suggest that this type of bargaining 
ystem is not known to promote relative wage flexibility, which raises the question if the
erman labor market really is responsive to policy measures as the one described here 
Calmfors, 2004). An alternative setting for the collective bargaining process is the so cal
ight-to-manage collective bargaining where the firm and the coalition of workers only 
onsider wages in the bargaining process. As the right-to-mange bargaining setting lets
irm freely choose the number of workers to hire, it gives the firm the opportunity to 
verhire also under collective bargaining. As illustrated by the model simulation the 
verhiring effect under individual bargaining leads to a considerably weaker response in 
abor market outcome from a cut in benefit entitlements. Thus right-to-manage removes
 50 
y improve the model by making it more compatible to the German 
bargaining system.    
t. 
wn to 
king the 
search and matching model more representative for the German labor market. 
of the factors leading to the strong response in labor market outcome under collective 
bargaining, which ma
In conclusion, there are many factors that have to be taken into account before it is 
possible to determine the real effectiveness of unemployment benefits as a policy instrumen
In my contribution to this evaluation the degree of product market competition is sho
be a decisive factor for the size of labor market response. Likewise, by considering 
alternative bargaining settings, one could improve the policy experiment by ma
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able 1: Calibration to German Data / Baseline Values 
arameter  Description      Source 
 1  Level of technology    Normalization 
 0  T  .50 he relative bargaining power Abowd and Allain (1996), Yashiv (2001) 
 0  E P.50  lasticity of the matching function  etrongolo and Pissarides (2000) 
0  T   .10 he labor market tightness ,  
B
Deutsche 
undesbank 
  8  U  B  .75 nemployment duration  undesagentür für Arbeit (2007) 
0 S.3614  caling parameter of the matching function    
 0  P   W.005  robability firm exits the market agner (1994) 
 9  L.9 ong run unemployment rate   Deutsche Bundesbank 
 0.0033  Monthly interest rate    Deutsche Bundesbank 
 0.0126  Total separation rate      
0 P   .0076  robability match is destroyed   
 0  R 6
O
 
.57 eal unemployment benefits                          4 % net replacement rate,             
ECD (2007) 
0 R.5749  eal vacancy posting cost    
 1  D F
 
 
1.95 emand elasticity/Product market competition ree entry condition 
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Appendix B: Figures 
Figure 1: The Shift in German Benefit’s Entitlements 
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with social assistance
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The replacement rates are based on the OECD summary measures (Martin, 1996). The gross 
replacement rate is the average of the gross unemployment benefit replacement rates for two earnings 
levels, three family situations and three durations of unemployment. The net replacement rate is an 
overall average of the net unemployment benefit replacement rates for two earnings levels and four 
family situations over 60 months of unemployment (OECD, 2007).  
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Figure 2: The Equilibrium Response 
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Response under Collective Bargaining 
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Figure 4: Equilibrium Response under Individual Bargaining 
 58 
Figure 5: The Free Entry Condition and the Long-Run Degree of Product Market Competition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Firm’s Profit and Entry Costs 
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 Figure 7: The Equilibrium Response of the Open Market 
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Bargaining Process:  Collective   Individual     Collective     Individual 
Unemployment Benefits  0,57  0,57  0,3  0,3 
Unemployment  9,9%  4,3%  5,7%  3,3% 
Tax Rates  0,034  0,014  0,010  0,005 
Real Wage after Tax  0,892  0,917  0,930  0,926 
Real Profit  0,038  0,046  0,043  0,049 
Reservation Wage  0,853  0,898  0,885  0,901 
Real Wage Cost per Worker  0,954  0,943  0,948  0,937 
Worker's Surplus  0,039  0,019  0,044  0,026 
Competition  11,95  13,84  11,04  13,86 
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Figure 8: Determining Bargaining Institution Stability 
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Endogenous bargaining institution: Criteria for symmetric Nash equilibrium 
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Figure 9: Robustness to Choice of Annual Interest Rate,  
Annual Interest Rate = 3,5 %  
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Bargaining Process:  Collective   Individual     Collective     Individual 
Unemployment Benefits  0,57  0,57  0,3  0,3 
Unemployment  9,8%  4,8%  5,7%  3,6% 
Tax Rates  0,034  0,016  0,010  0,006 
Real Wage after Tax  0,892  0,915  0,929  0,925 
Real Profit  0,037  0,044  0,042  0,048 
Reservation Wage  0,854  0,894  0,885  0,897 
Real Wage Cost per Worker  0,954  0,943  0,947  0,936 
Worker's Surplus  0,038  0,020  0,044  0,028 
Competition  12,24  14,48  11,18  14,51 
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Figure 10: Robustness to Choice of Annual Interest Rate,  
Annual interest rate = 4,5 % 
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Bargaining Process:  Collective   Individual    Collective     Individual 
Unemployment Benefits  0,57  0,57  0,3  0,3 
Unemployment  9,8%  3,6%  5,5%  2,7% 
Tax Rates  0,034  0,011  0,009  0,004 
Real Wage after Tax  0,893  0,923  0,932  0,930 
Real Profit  0,039  0,047  0,043  0,050 
Reservation Wage  0,853  0,907  0,888  0,908 
Real Wage Cost per Worker  0,955  0,944  0,950  0,938 
Worker's Surplus  0,040  0,016  0,044  0,022 
Competition  11,71  13,17  11,04  13,17 
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Figure 11: Robustness to Choice of Mean Duration of Unemployment,  
 = 7.5 
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Bargaining Process:  Collective   Individual     Collective    Individual 
Unemployment Benefits  0,57  0,57  0,3  0,3 
Unemployment  9,9%  4,1%  5,6%  3,1% 
Tax Rates  0,034  0,013  0,009  0,005 
Real Wage after Tax  0,893  0,920  0,932  0,929 
Real Profit  0,037  0,044  0,041  0,047 
Reservation Wage  0,855  0,903  0,889  0,905 
Real Wage Cost per Worker  0,955  0,945  0,950  0,939 
Worker's Surplus  0,038  0,017  0,043  0,024 
Competition  12,24  13,85  11,47  13,85 
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Figure 12: Robustness to Choice of Mean Duration of Unemployment,  
 = 10 
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Bargaining Process:  Collective   Individual     Collective     Individual 
Unemployment Benefits  0,57  0,57  0,3  0,3 
Unemployment  9,8%  4,5%  5,7%  3,4% 
Tax Rates  0,034  0,014  0,010  0,006 
Real Wage after Tax  0,891  0,916  0,928  0,925 
Real Profit  0,039  0,047  0,044  0,052 
Reservation Wage  0,852  0,896  0,883  0,898 
Real Wage Cost per Worker  0,954  0,942  0,947  0,935 
Worker's Surplus  0,040  0,020  0,046  0,027 
Competition  11,71  13,86  10,69  13,86 
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Figure 13: Robustness to Choice of Labor Market Tightness,  
 = 0.075, the median value 
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Bargaining Process:  Collective   Individual     Collective     Individual 
Unemployment Benefits  0,57  0,57  0,3  0,3 
Unemployment  9,9%  4,3%  5,7%  3,3% 
Tax Rates  0,034  0,014  0,010  0,005 
Real Wage after Tax  0,892  0,917  0,930  0,926 
Real Profit  0,038  0,046  0,043  0,049 
Reservation Wage  0,853  0,898  0,885  0,901 
Real Wage Cost per Worker  0,954  0,943  0,948  0,937 
Worker's surplus  0,039  0,019  0,044  0,026 
Competition  11,95  13,84  11,04  13,86 
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Figure 14: Robustness to Choice of Entry Costs,  
 = 0,118 and  = 41,4  
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Bargaining Process:  Collective   Individual     Collective     Individual 
Unemployment Benefits  0,564  0,564  0,3  0,3 
Unemployment  9,8%  7,7%  6,4%  5,8% 
Tax Rates  0,034  0,026  0,011  0,010 
Real Wage after Tax  0,885  0,892  0,911  0,909 
Real Profit  0,037  0,042  0,046  0,048 
Reservation Wage  0,846  0,860  0,862  0,865 
Real Wage Cost per Worker  0,946  0,939  0,931  0,927 
Worker's Surplus  0,039  0,031  0,048  0,044 
Competition  12,04  18,35  10,11  18,37 
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Figure 15: Robustness to Choice of Firm Exit Rate,  
 = 0.004 
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Bargaining Process:  Collective   Individual     Collective     Individual 
Unemployment Benefits  0,564  0,564  0,3  0,3 
Unemployment  9,8%  6,6%  6,1%  5,0% 
Tax Rates  0,033  0,022  0,010  0,009 
Real Wage after Tax  0,887  0,899  0,916  0,913 
Real Profit  0,038  0,043  0,045  0,048 
Reservation Wage  0,848  0,871  0,870  0,875 
Real Wage Cost per Worker  0,948  0,939  0,936  0,929 
Worker's Surplus  0,039  0,027  0,046  0,038 
Competition  12,02  15,68  10,53  15,70 
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Figure 16: Robustness to Choice of Firm Exit Rate,  
 = 0.006 
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Bargaining Process:  Collective   Individual    Collective     Individual 
Unemployment Benefits  0,57  0,57  0,3  0,3 
Unemployment  9,9%  0,4%  5,2%  0,3% 
Tax Rates  0,034  0,001  0,009  0,000 
Real Wage after Tax  0,895  0,954  0,941  0,955 
Real Profit  0,038  0,043  0,040  0,043 
Reservation Wage  0,856  0,952  0,900  0,952 
Real Wage Cost per Worker  0,958  0,956  0,958  0,956 
Worker's Surplus  0,039  0,002  0,042  0,002 
Competition  11,84  12,40  11,82  12,40 
 
